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Abstract
We consider a cash-in-advance economy under uncertainty in which mone-
tary policy sets either short-term nominal interest rates or money supplies. We
show that both the initial price level and the distribution of the inﬂation rate
up to its expectation are indeterminate, regardless of the degree of competition
or the ﬂexibility of prices in commodity markets. This indeterminacy is not
related to the stability of a deterministic steady state.
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We consider a stochastic cash-in-advance economy with monopolistic competition
and sticky prices, and we examine the extent to which monetary policy can con-
trol the path of the equilibrium inﬂation rate. The controlability of inﬂation is of
practical importance. If the indeterminacy of the inﬂation rate is associated with
indeterminacy of the real allocation, it is the source of undesirable ﬂuctuations. In
the presence of indeterminacy, the deﬁnition of optimal monetary-ﬁscal policy as
one that supports an optimal allocation 1 is inadequate. The possible role of ﬁs-
cal policy in price-level determination, as emphasized, for example, by Woodford
(1996), depends on the ability of monetary policy to control inﬂation.
Indeterminacy of non-monetary economies is often related to the dynamic prop-
erties of a deterministic steady state 2. However, there is a diﬀerent source of
indeterminacy in monetary economies, which is closely related to the well known
fact that only relative prices are determined in equilibrium. This type of indeter-
minacy, which is the one we examine here, does not derive from the stability of a
deterministic steady state, and it does not rely on an inﬁnite horizon. To stress this
point, we consider a two-period economy, although the extension of our results to
the inﬁnite-horizon case would be straightforward.
We consider two forms of monetary policy: interest-rate policy and money-supply
policy. The latter sets an exogenous path of money supplies, and the former an
exogenous path of one-period nominal interest rates 3. Fiscal policy satisﬁes an
intertemporal budget constraint, and it pays oﬀ the public debt at the end of the
last period, for all possible, equilibrium or out-of-equilibrium values of price levels,
money supplies, and interest rates 4. Monopolistically competitive producers supply
diﬀerentiated commodities. Their prices are either ﬂexible or sticky over time.
We show that both the initial price level and the distribution of the inﬂation
rate up to its expectation are indeterminate, regardless of the degree of competi-
tion or the ﬂexibility of prices in commodity markets; more formally, a “nominal
1A useful survey of this literature is given by Chari and Kehoe (1999).
2A useful survey of this literature is Benhabib and Farmer (1999).
3The monetary policy we examine here is not Taylor rule. However, given our speciﬁcation of
ﬁscal policy, considering Taylor rule does not aﬀects the results.
4In the terminology of Woodford (1996), Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001, 2002), ﬁscal
policy is Ricardian.
1equivalent martingale measure,” and the initial price level index the indeterminacy
at equilibrium. In particular, the degree of indeterminacy is exactly the same as in
the economy with perfect competition in Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2001). In
the ﬂexible-price case, under interest-rate policy, the real allocation is unique, and
hence, indeterminacy is nominal: diﬀerent nominal equivalent martingale measures
only aﬀect inﬂation rates. In the sticky-price case, even under interest-rate policy,
indeterminacy is real: diﬀerent nominal equivalent martingale measures are asso-
ciated with diﬀerent real allocations. Under money-supply policy, indeterminacy
is real both in the ﬂexible-price and sticky-price cases. Also, under money-supply
policy, there exists a zero-interest-rate equilibrium, unless money supply decreases
too fast.
Our argument explains why ﬁscal policy may matter for the price-level deter-
mination. Monetary policy leaves the initial price level and the nominal equivalent
martingale measure undetermined. This means that the degree of indeterminacy is
exactly equal to the number of the terminal nodes of the date-event tree. The ﬁscal
policy we consider leaves no public debt at any terminal node, whether at equilib-
rium or out-of equilibrium price levels, money supplies or interest rates. If, however,
the ﬁscal policy is not constrained to satisfy an intertemporal budget constraint5, it
may impose additional restrictions on equilibrium price levels, since, at equilibrium,
public debt is a fortiori paid oﬀ at each terminal node.
Our result is closely related to the indeterminacy result in Cass (1985), Balasko
and Cass (1989), and Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell (1989). They considered an
incomplete-market economy where money serves only as a unit of account, and they
showed that the indeterminacy of inﬂation has real eﬀects; since money is only an
abstract unit of account, there is no room for monetary policy there. Bloise, Dr` eze
and Polemarchakis (2000a,b) and Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2001) extended the
results to a cash-in-advance economy with monetary and ﬁscal policy. Here, we
extend those results to an economy with monopolistic competition and sticky prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we analyze equilibria
in a monopolistic-competition model with ﬂexible prices. In Section 3, we consider
the case in which prices must be set in advance. In Section 4, we examine the case
in which prices are set in a staggered manner.
5Such ﬁscal policy is non-Ricardian in Woodford (1996), Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe
(2001, 2002); this is, also, the case for the speciﬁcation in Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992).
22 Monopolistic Competition with Flexible Prices
We ﬁrst describe the baseline economy with monopolistic competition. Money is
valued through the cash-in-advance constraint as in Lucas and Stokey (1987). We
shall see that the nominal equivalent martingale measure, as well as the initial price
level, are indeterminate, and the degree of indeterminacy is equal to the number
of terminal nodes of the date-event tree. This exactly parallels the case of perfect
competition.6
2.1 Households
There are two dates: 0 and 1. States of the world at date 1 are indexed by s 2 S =
f1;:::;Sg. Each state occurs with a probability f(s) > 0, s 2 S.
There is a continuum of households, distributed uniformly over [0;1]. At each
date-event, household j 2 [0;1] produces a diﬀerentiated product j. Let y0(j) and
y1(s;j) denote the amount of output produced by household j at date 0 and at state
s 2 S at date 1, respectively. The amount of commodity i 2 [0;1] consumed by




1(s;i), s 2 S.

















































; s 2 S;
we interpret y as the endowment of time, and (y ¡y) as the consumption of leisure,
l 7.
Assumption 1. The ﬂow utility function, u : R2
++ ! R, is continuously diﬀer-
entiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave. It also satisﬁes satisﬁes u11u2 ¡
u12u1 < 0, u22u1 ¡ u12u2 < 0, limc!0 u1 = liml!0 u2 = 1.
6For example, in Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2001).
7In the terminology of Lucas and Stokey (1987), y and (y¡y) are the endowment and consump-
tion of “credit goods,” and c is consumption of “cash goods.”
3Note that this assumption guarantees that u1(c;y¡c)=u2(c;y¡c) is strictly decreas-
ing in c; it guarantees the existence of an equilibrium, but not its determinacy.
Let p0(i) and p1(s;i) be the spot prices of good i at date 0 and at state s at date



















; s 2 S:
















1(s;i)di; s 2 S:

























c1(s); s 2 S: (3)
Given these demand functions, household j chooses p0(j) and p1(s;j), s 2 S, to
maximize its lifetime utility.
As in Lucas and Stokey (1987), we assume that a household cannot consume
what it produces; instead, it has to purchase each diﬀerentiated product with cash
from other households. Also, the cash it obtains from selling its product has to be
carried over to the next period.
Consider household j 2 [0;1]. We assume that households are identical except
that what they produce are diﬀerentiated products. The household enters the initial
period 0 with the nominal wealth w0, that consists of cash, m, and public debt, b0,
w0 = m + b0:
4At the beginning of the period, the government distributes an equal amount of
nominal transfers (taxes if negative), ¿0, across households. Then the asset market
opens, and there is a complete set of contingent claims. Let q(s) be the price of the
contingent claim that pays oﬀ one unit of currency if and only if state s occurs at




q(s)b1(s) · w0 + ¿0; (4)
where ˆ m0 is the amount of cash obtained by the household, and b1(s) is the amount








The market for goods open next. The purchase of the consumption goods is subject







0 · ˆ m0: (6)
The household also receives cash by selling its output, y0(j). Hence, the amount of
cash that it carries over to the next period, m0, is
m0 = p0(j)y0(j) + ˆ m0 ¡ P0c
j
0: (7)
Given (7), the cash-in-advance constraint (6) is equivalent to the constraint on m0
that
m0 ¸ p0(j)y0(j): (8)
The household enters state s at the second date with nominal wealth
w1(s) = m0 + b1(s); s 2 S: (9)
Substituting for ˆ m0 and b1(s) from (7) and (9) into (4) yields the ﬂow budget










· w0 + ¿0 + p0(j)y0(j)
5The household’s choice in the ﬁrst period is subject to the ﬂow budget constraint
(10) and the cash constraint (8).
The transactions the household makes at the second date are similar, except for
the fact that no uncertainty remains. Let r1(s) be the nominal interest rate in state
s 2 S. Then the ﬂow budget constraint and the cash constraint the household faces










· w1(s) + ¿1(s) + p1(s;j)y1(s;j);
and
m1(s) ¸ p1(s;j)y1(s;j); (12)
where w2(s) is the nominal wealth the household leaves at the end of state s in the
second period.
Since the household cannot leave debt,
w2(s) ¸ 0 (13)








































p1(s;j)y1(s;j); s 2 S;
because, with r > 0, the cash constraint binds; if r = 0 both sides of the above



























and p1(j) so as to utility (1) subject to the life-time budget constraint (15), and the
demand functions for its product (2) and (3). The lifetime budget constraint should
bind at optimum; that is,
w2(s) = 0; s 2 S (16)























































for all s 2 S and j 2 [0;1].
2.2 The monetary-ﬁscal authority












W2(s) = W1(s) + T1(s); s 2 S (21)
where M0 and M1(s) are money supplies, W0, W1(s), W2(s) are the total liabilities
of the monetary-ﬁscal authority, and T0 and T1(s) are aggregate transfers to the
households.
Monetary Policy. Monetary policy sets either nominal interest rates, r0 and r1(s),
s 2 S, or money supplies, M0 and M1(s), s 2 S.
We assume that ﬁscal policy is “Ricardian,” in the sense used by Woodford (1996)
and Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001, 2002), among others. In particular,
we assume the following form of ﬁscal policy, which is a stochastic analogue of the one
considered by Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001, 2002). Let W1(s), s 2 S,
denote the “composition” of the debt portfolio of the monetary-ﬁscal authority, and
d be the “scale” of the debt:




7Fiscal Policy. The ﬁscal authority sets (1) the reﬁnancing rate of the initial liability,
® 2 (0;1], and (2) the composition of the debt portfolio, W1(s), s 2 S. At date 0,
















where W1(s) = dW1(s).
Note that this ﬁscal policy rule implies that
W2(s) = 0; s 2 S; (22)
for all possible, equilibrium or non-equilibrium, values of P, r, and M.
2.3 Equilibrium conditions
Since households are symmetric, the market clearing conditions are given by
c0 = c
j
0 = y0(i); c1(s) = c
j
1(s) = y1(s;i);
P0 = p0(j); P1(s) = p1(s;j);
m0 = M0; m1(s) = M1(s);
w1(s) = W1(s); w2(s) = W2(s);
for all i;j 2 [0;1] and s 2 S. Also, consistency requires that
¿0 = T0; ¿1(s) = T1(s); w0 = W0:
The no-arbitrage condition (5) implies that the prices of elementary securities,




; s 2 S; (23)




It follows that ¹ can be viewed as a probability measure over S, the nominal equiva-
lent martingale measure. We shall see that there are no equilibrium conditions that
determine ¹, regardless of whether monetary policy sets interest rates or money sup-
plies; in other words, ¹ is indeterminate. A symmetric equilibrium under interest-
rate policy is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition. Given the initial public liability, w0 = W0, interest-rate policy, fr0;r1
(s)g, and ﬁscal policy, f®;W1(s)g, a symmetric equilibrium consists of an allocation,
fc0;c1(s);y0;y1(s)g, a portfolio of households, fm0;m1(s);w1(s);w2(s)g, a portfolio
of the monetary-ﬁscal authority, fM0;M1(s);W1(s);W2(s)g, transfers, fT0;T1(s)g,
spot-market prices, fP0;P1(s)g, and nominal equivalent martingale measure, ¹, such
that
(a) given W0 and fr0;r1(s);M0;M1(s)g, ﬁscal policy f®;W1(s)g determines trans-
fers ¿0 = T0 and ¿1(s) = T1(s), s 2 S, and debt portfolio fW1(s);W2(s)g;
(b) the monetary authority accommodates the money demand, M0 = m0 and
M1(s) = m1(s), s 2 S;
(c) given interest rates, r0, r1(s), spot-market prices, p0(j) = P(0), p1(s;j) =
P1(s), all j, nominal equivalent martingale measure, ¹, and transfers, ¿0, ¿1(s),
the household’s problem is solved by c
j
0 = c0, c
j
1(s) = c1(s), y0(j) = y0,
y1(j;s) = y1(s), m0, m1(s), w1(s), and w2(s);
(d) all market clear.
A symmetric equilibrium under money-supply policy is similarly deﬁned.
2.4 Equilibria under interest-rate policy
Consider an interest-rate policy, fr0;r1(s);s 2 Sg. To guarantee the existence of
an existence of equilibrium, we restrict the boundary behavior of the ﬂow utility
function:






for each y > 0.
The following proposition shows that P0 and ¹ are not determined, and hence,
there is S-dimensional indeterminacy, which is exactly the same result obtained in
the case of perfect competition.
Proposition 1. Monetary policy sets interest-rates, fr0;r1(s);s 2 Sg. Fiscal policy
sets ® 2 (0;1] and W1(s), s 2 S. The initial liability is w0 = W0. Then
(a) a competitive equilibrium exists;
(b) the equilibrium allocation fc0;c1(s);y0;y1(s)g is unique;
(c) the initial price, P0, and the nominal equivalent martingale measure, ¹, are
indeterminate: for any P0 > 0 and for any strictly positive probability measure









M0 ¸ P0c0; M1(s) ¸ P1(s)c1(s); (equality if r0;r1(s) > 0);




support the allocation fc0;c1(s);y0;y1(s)g.
Proof. Given interest rates r0 and r1(s), s 2 S, the ﬁrst-order conditions (17)-(18)

























; s 2 S:
Our assumptions on u guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the solutions to
these equations. The equilibrium output of each product j, j 2 [0;1], at each date-
event, y0(j) and y1(s;j), s 2 S, is given by
y0(j) = c0; and y1(s;j) = c1(s); s 2 S; j 2 [0;1]:
10Fiscal policy sets transfers so that w2(s) = W2(s) = 0, all s. Hence, the allocation
is uniquely determined. It is straightforward to see that given any P0 > 0, and ¹,
the prices and portfolio constructed as in the proposition support the equilibrium
allocation.
Notice that the indeterminacy of ¹ implies that the inﬂation rate, ¼1(s) ´
P1(s)=P0 is indeterminate. Thus, interest-rate policy does not determine the stochas-
tic path of inﬂation. Note also that the shock in this model could be purely extrinsic.
If r1(s) and y1(s) are identical for all s, the economy does not have any uncertainty
in “fundamentals.” Nevertheless, there are equilibria in which the inﬂation rate,
P1(s)=P0, varies across states.
The reason why P(0) and ¹ are indeterminate is simple, and closely related to
the fact that only relative prices are determined in equilibrium. Look at equation
(14). The relative prices between consumption and real balances are r0=[1+r0] and
rs=[1+rs], which are set by monetary policy. Given these prices, the equilibrium real
balances, M0=P0 and M1(s)=P1(s), are determined. Also, the intertemporal relative
prices of consumption, q(s)P1(s)=P0, are determined in equilibrium, which gives S
restrictions on q(s), P1(s), and P0 (2S + 1 prices). In addition, the no-arbitrage
condition (23) imposes one restriction on q(s). There are no further restrictions.
Hence, there are (S+1) equations in (2S+1) variables, which leads to indeterminacy
of degree S, and P0 and ¹ are undetermined.
It is straightforward to extend the model to T periods (T may be inﬁnity). Let
st 2 S be the shock realized at date t, and st = (s0;:::;st) 2 St be the date-event
(or history). Suppose again that there exists a complete set of elementary securities.
Let q0(st) be the date-0 price of the elementary security that pays oﬀ one unit of
currency if and only if st occurs. Then, there exists a probability measure, ¹, over







for all st 2 St and t = 0;1;:::;T. In the T-period economy, the initial price P0, and
the nominal equivalent martingale measure, ¹, are not determined. The degree of
indeterminacy is, therefore, ST, which is equal to the number of terminal nodes.
Indeterminacy may go away if the ﬁscal policy rule is such that the monetary-
ﬁscal authority may leave non-zero debt for some (non-equilibrium) values of P
11and M (that is, if it is “non-Ricardian”), as discussed, for example, in Woodford
(1994, 1996), Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001), and Nakajima and Pole-
marchakis (2001).
2.5 Equilibria under money-supply policy
Consider a money-supply policy, fM0;M1(s)g. Deﬁne c¤
0 and c¤

























Such a c¤ exists and is unique under Assumption 1. Note that c¤ is the level of
consumption when the nominal interest rate is zero. To guarantee the existence of
an equilibrium, we impose an alternative boundary restriction on the ﬂow utility
function:
Assumption 3. The ﬂow utility function, u, has the property that for all y > 0,
lim
c!0
cu1(c;y ¡ c) = 0;
and the function cu1(c;y ¡ c) is monotonically increasing in the interval (0;c¤(y)).
The next proposition shows that under money-supply policy there is the same
degree of indeterminacy as under interest-rate policy but indeterminacy is real.
Proposition 2. Monetary policy sets the money-supply, fM0;M1(s);s 2 Sg. Fiscal
policy sets ® 2 (0;1] and W1(s), s 2 S. The initial liability is w0 = W0. Then
(a) a competitive equilibrium exists;
(b) the initial price, P0, and the nominal equivalent martingale measure, ¹, are
indeterminate. For any strictly positive P0 and ¹, there exists a unique com-
petitive equilibrium corresponding to them.
(c) the indeterminacy regarding P0 and ¹ is real: diﬀerent P0 or diﬀerent ¹ are
associated with diﬀerent allocations as well as diﬀerent inﬂation rates.
Proof. Let the initial price P0 and the strictly positive probability measure ¹ be
arbitrarily given. Let M0 and M1(s), s 2 S, be the money supplies chosen by the
























then let c1(s) = c¤







The unique existence of a solution is guaranteed by Assumption 3. Given c1(s),














Given the path of nominal interest rates, fr0;r1(s)g, the debt portfolio, fW1(s)g, is
determined as in the proof of the previous proposition.
As in the case with interest-rate policy, the shock could be purely extrinsic.
That is, even when the second-period money supply does not depend on s, there are
equilibria in which the allocation and inﬂation rate both vary across states. Also,
the same remark applies for the T-period extension.
Given recent discussions on the “liquidity trap,” the following corollary of the
proposition would be of some interest.8 It says that, as long as money supply does
not decrease too much in the second period, there always exists an equilibrium in
which the nominal interest rate equals zero at all date-events.












Corollary 3. Consider money-supply policy, fM0;M1(s);s 2 Sg. Fiscal policy sets
® 2 (0;1] and W1(s), s 2 S. The initial condition is w0 = W0. Suppose that
Assumptions 1 and 4 are satisﬁed. Then, there exists a competitive equilibrium in
which the nominal interest rate is identically zero, r0 = r1(s) = 0, all s.
8For example, Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2002) and Woodford (1999). Note, however,
that in this model, a zero interest rate equilibrium is (constrained) optimal.
13Proof. Choose any P0 · M0=c¤
0 and let ¹ = f. Then, it is straightforward to see
that the following allocation and price system constitute an equilibrium.
c0 = c¤
0; c1(s) = c¤
1(s);
y0 = y0 ¡ c¤











r0 = r1(s) = 0:






3 Prices Set in Advance
We have seen that if prices are changed freely at each date-event then equilibrium
prices are not determined in spite of the fact that prices are set by monopolists.
Now suppose that we are interested in an equilibrium with the property that the
second-period prices, P1(s), are the same across states:
P1(s) = P1; s 2 S:
Such an equilibrium may appear similar to a “sticky-price equilibrium” in that the
second-period price, P1(s), does not depend on the realization of the shock, s, and
hence it is interpreted as “predetermined.” The question asked in this section is
whether or not such a requirement leads to the uniqueness of equilibrium. In fact,
among equilibria considered in the economy with ﬂexible prices, there is a unique
¹ with such a property. To see this, consider interest-rate policy, and let P1 be the
price level in the second period, which does not depend on states s. Remember
that interest-rate policy determines an allocation uniquely. Then the inﬂation rate,





























However, this only means the uniqueness of “ﬂexible-price equilibrium” with the
property that the second-period price is identical across states. It does not imply the
uniqueness of “sticky-price equilibrium” in which all monopolists explicitly take into
account the constraint that the second-period price must be set in advance. Indeed,
we shall see that sticky-price equilibrium is indeterminate, and, furthermore, the
degree of indeterminacy equals the number of terminal nodes, S, which is exactly
the same as the one associated with ﬂexible-price equilibrium.
Suppose that the initial prices p0(j), j 2 [0;1], are given and identical for all j:
p0(j) = p; j 2 [0;1]:
It follows that P0 = p. In the ﬁrst period, each household j 2 [0;1] chooses the
second-price, p1(s;j), before observing the shock s. It follows that the second-period
price is identical across state, so that it is written as
p1(s;j) = p1(j); j 2 [0;1];
for some p1(j). Given p and p1(j), the household must supply product j by the


















and p1(j) so as to maximize the lifetime expected utility (1) subject to the demand













































; s 2 S: (27)
























where we have used the equilibrium condition that p1(j) = P1, all j 2 [0;1].
As in the previous section, households are all symmetric. The market clearing
conditions are the same as in the previous section.
Consider interest-rate policy, fr0;r1(s);s 2 Sg. The next proposition shows
that there is S-dimensional indeterminacy in this economy, and that indeterminacy
is indexed by P1 and ¹, just as in the economy with ﬂexible prices. Here, however,
indeterminacy is real.
Proposition 4. Second-period prices are set in advance. Interest-rate policy is,
fr0;r1(s);s 2 Sg. Fiscal policy sets ® 2 (0;1] and W1(s), s 2 S. The initial liability
is w0 = W0 and the initial price level is P0 = p. Then
(a) a competitive equilibrium exists;
(b) the price level in the second period, P1, and the nominal equivalent martingale
measure, ¹, are indeterminate;
(c) the indeterminacy is real: diﬀerent P1 or diﬀerent ¹ are associated with dif-
ferent allocations.
Proof. Let P1 and ¹ be given. Then the ﬁrst-order conditions (27) imply that














; s 2 S:
Under our assumptions, these equations can be solved for c1(s) as strictly increasing
functions of c0. Write them as
c1(s) = Ás(c0); s 2 S;



















Under our assumptions, there is a unique c0 that satisﬁes this equation. This com-
pletes the proof.
As in the previous section, considering money-supply policy instead of interest-
rate policy does not change the degree of indeterminacy. In the T-period economy,
P1 and ¹ are not determined. The degree of indeterminacy is therefore ST, which
is equal to the number of terminal nodes, just as in the two-period economy.
4 Staggered Price Setting
In the previous section we have seen that the degree of indeterminacy remains the
same even when the second-period price is set in advance in the ﬁrst period. In
this section, we see that the result is unchanged when prices are set in a staggered
fashion.
Suppose that at the beginning of the initial period each household is allocated
into one of two groups. Households in the ﬁrst group must set the ﬁrst-period price
of its product, p0(j), at p, but they can charge the second-period price, p1(s;j),
freely. Households in the second group, on the other hand, can charge the ﬁrst-
period price freely, but they must charge the same price in the second period, thus
p0(j) = p1(s;j), all s 2 S. The allocation of households into these two groups is
done stochastically, and the probability that each household is allocated to each
group is 1=2. We assume that there is perfect risk sharing among households.
For simplicity, we restrict the form of the ﬂow utility function.































































1(s), i = 1;2, are consumption when the household is allocated to
group i, and yi
0(j) and yi
1(s;j) are production of product j. Let p1(s;j) be the price
charged in the second period at state s if the household is allocated to the ﬁrst
group; p0(j) be the price charged in both periods if the household is allocated to the
second group. It follows that yi
0(j) and yi


























c1(s); s 2 S;
where c0 and c1(s) denote aggregate consumption.
Since there is perfect risk sharing among households, consumption is identical
between the two groups:
c1
0 = c2
0 = c0; and c1
1(s) = c2
1(s) = c1(s); s 2 S:













The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the second-period price charged by the














The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the price charged in both periods by the






































18In a symmetric equilibrium, households in the same group choose the same prices,
so that we can write




































Note that P1(s)=P0 is an increasing function of p1(s)=P1(s), and p0=P1(s) is a de-


























c1(s); s 2 S: (35)
Consider interest-rate policy, fr0;r1(s);s 2 Sg. The next proposition shows that
this economy, once again, has S-dimensional indeterminacy, indexed by the initial
price P0 and the nominal equivalent martingale measure ¹.
Proposition 5. Price setting is staggered. Interest-rate policy is fr0;r1(s);s 2 Sg.
Fiscal policy sets ® 2 (0;1] and W1(s), s 2 S. The initial conditions are w0 = W0
and p. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 5 are satisﬁed. Then
(a) a competitive equilibrium exists;
(b) the initial price level, P0, and the nominal equivalent martingale measure, ¹,
are indeterminate;
(c) the indeterminacy is real: diﬀerent P0 or diﬀerent ¹ are associated with dif-
ferent allocations.


















19for each s 2 S. These equations imply that c1(s) is a strictly increasing function
of p1(s)=P1(s). Given the fact that P1(s)=P0 is a strictly increasing function of
p1(s)=P1(s), the ﬁrst-order conditions (29) determine p1(s)=P1(s), as a strictly in-
creasing function of c0. Then, consider (31), and note that the left-hand side of this
equation is strictly increasing in c0 and becomes negative as c0 ! 0. Hence, there
is a unique c0. Note that c1(s), p1(s)=P1(s), and P1(s)=P0 are functions of c0 and
derived above. This completes the proof.
As in the previous Sections, money-supply policy does not change the degree of
indeterminacy. In the T-period economy, indeterminacy is indexed by the initial
price level, P0, and the nominal equivalent martingale measure, ¹. The dimension
of indeterminacy is therefore ST, as in the economies studies we considered earlier.
5 Conclusion
We have considered various speciﬁcations of a monetary economy, and we have seen
that in every one competitive equilibria display indeterminacy of dimension equal
to the number of terminal nodes. It is immaterial whether prices are ﬂexible, set in
advance, or set in a staggered way; whether monetary policy sets interest rates or
money supplies; or whether money derives its value from cash-in-advance constraints
— money-in-the-utility generates the same degree of indeterminacy.
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